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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
--vs. -

CaseNo. 10057.

WAYNE PEARSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant was convicted, along with one Joseph
Newton Cummings, of the crime of escape from the Utah
State Prison, and appeals from his conviction in the Third
Judicial District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of facts
as being a more accurate record of what actually was presented in the lower court.
On May 22, 1963, between approximately 7: 45 and
8:00 p.m., Officer Robert Warren, a Prison guard at the
Utah State Prison, then on duty at Tower 1, noticed two
inmates who had climbed over both fences surrounding the
main Prison building, head towards the prison parking lot
(R. 35, 36). Officer Warren fired in their direction (R. 37).
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The two prisoners got into a Comet automobile and forced
the people who were in the automobile to get out. Thereafter the prisoners drove the car out through the front gate
of the Prison and down the road for a short distance (R. 38,
40 )- A State car containing Prison officers followed (R. 38,
40) , and a short distance from the abandoned vehicle
Joseph Newton Cummings, the accomplice of Wayne Pearson, the appellant herein, was found hiding in some rocks.
Although the appellant had been shot in the back of the
head during the escape (R. 56), he managed to continue
his flight to his brother's home, approximately 15 miles
away. On the 23rd of May, the next day after the escape,
his brother called Deputy Warden Garnett Fitzgerald and
indicated that the appellant was ready to turn himself in
(R. 44).
At the time of trial the appellant attempted to raise the
defense of coercion ( R. 4 7) . The evidence in this regard
was that approximately two weeks prior to the escape, the
appellant broke a radio belonging to another prisoner. The
other prisoner indicated he wanted him to pay, but the
appellant indicated he had no money. Thereafter appellant was beat up (R. 47). Subsequently he was beat up
two more times ( R. 50, 51 ) . The appellant requested to be
moved to another part of the Prison for protection and
Prison guards had informed him that the move would have
to be okayed by higher officials ( R. 49) . On the night of the
escape the appellant testified that he was beat up by three
convicts and that during the course of the beating he was
cut on the hand by one of them who had a knife. They told
him that they were going to kill him ( R. 49). Subsequently,
the appellant removed himself from their presence, con·
tacted inmate Cummings and indicated a desire to attempt
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to escape. Thereafter Cummings and the appellant hid in
the Prison Chapel, left the Prison, climbed over the fences
and made their get-a-way (R. 60). There was no coercion
or threat to the appellant at the time he left the convicts
who had beat him, at the time he was hiding in the Chapel
or after he had left the fenced premises ( R. 58 through 60) .
The appellant testified that he could have walked around
to the guard tower after having climbed over the fences
(R. 60). During the course of his testimony, the appellant
ref used to mention the identity of the persons who were
allegedly threatening him ( R. 52).
The trial court struck the evidence of coercion against
the appellant, ruling that as a matter of law there was no
showing that at the time the act of escape occurred that
there was an imminent threat of physical harm or injury
(R. 62). The trial court also refused to instruct the jury on
the issue of coercion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENSE OF COERCION IS NOT PROPERLY RAISED
IN THE INST ANT CASE SINCE EVEN ASSUMING THE
THREATS WERE SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE COERCION, THE COERCION WAS NOT DIRECTED AT THE ACT
OF ESCAPE.

The appellant argues that the facts in the instant case
raise an issue for the jury on the basis that the appellant was
coerced into escaping. The appellant relies upon 76-141 (9), U.C.A. 1953, which excuses criminal guilt from:
"Persons, unless the crime is punishable with death, who commit
the act or make the omission charged under threats or menaces
sufficient to show that they have reasonable cause to believe, and
do believe, their lives will be endangered if they refuse."
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It should be noted that the provisions of this statute require
that the coercion be directed towards compelling the individual to commit the offense charged. This is obvious
from the last three words, "if they refuse," which obviously
indicate that the danger to the individual must arise from
refusing to perform the particular act which he is beinab
coerced into performing. Textual authorities generally support the position that the crime committed must be coerced
and not that it be general coercion which the defendant
relieves himself from by committing the crime. Williams,
Criminal Law, 2nd Ed., G.P. 1961, states:
"A crime is said to be committed under duress (or duress per minas)
when there is a threat of physical harm in case the act be not
done.***"

True coercion is directed to compelling a person to perform a specific act and does not involve a situation where
the person takes an alternative choice because of necessitous
circumstances. The concept of coercion is similar to the
1
concept of necessity. Russell, Crimes, 7th Ed., p. 91 ; Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, Sec. 1378.
In the instant case there was no compulsion that if the
appellant did not escape he would be killed. The appellant
determined himself to escape and was not told by others to
perform the act. Consequently, the concept of coercion is
not present as a matter of law. Since this is the only issue
raised at trial by the appellant ( R. 4 7), the fact that the
doctrine of necessity might otherwise be applicable cannot
be claimed of error since, ( 1 ) it was not raised in the trial
court, nor instructions requested thereon; and ( 2) it is not
1 Russell states that necessity is closely related to compulsion but that it
involves a choice of evils and not a specific compulsion towards the act done.
The case most often cited for the concept of necessity is Regina V; Dudleid
14 QBD 2 7 3, where the court refused to excuse British sailors from killing an
eating their cabin boy.
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raised in the case on appeal." The cases cited by the appellant in favor of applying the doctrine of coercion do not
involve situations where the appellant committed the offense not because he was asked or compelled to commit the
particular offense, but because he thought it might exculpate him from some other injury. All of the cases cited by
the appellant involve situations where the individual acted
in committing the specific crime because he was directed to
commit the specific crime for fear of injury "if [he] refuse."
It is noteworthy that Section 2.09 of the Model Penal
Code recognizes the defense of duress, but does so obviously
with the intent that the coercion be directed towards the
act done. Thus the section states:
"It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct
charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do
so***."

The cases which have specifically considered the problem of prison conditions as against the claim that escape is
justified have refused to recognize that coercion in general,
not directly requiring or compelling the individual to commit the crime of escape, is a sufficient justification to raise a
defense to an escape charge. To do so would be to confuse
the concept of duress or coercion with that of necessity.
Compare Sections 5.15 and 5.16, Clark and Marshall,
Crimes, 6th Ed.
In People v. Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261, 279 Pac. 1008
( 1929), the appellant sought to raise the contention that his
escape was justified because he was being imprisoned under
2
The State contends that the concept of necessity is equally inapplicable in
this case by virtue of the fact that at the time the offense was committed there
was no necessitous circumstance immediately imminent compelling its commission Additionally, the defense of necessity is applicable only so lo~g as the
nrcessity lasts and since the necessity terminated in the instant case prior to the
tirnr the escape was effected, the doctrine is equally inapplicable.
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unsanitary conditions and that he was being subjected to
and was in fear of inhumane punishment inflicted by the
custodian. The court refused to recognize the defense and
wisely noted:
"It is manifest that to allow a prisoner to decide 'Nhether the con.
ditions justify him in attempting to escape would be destructive of
the necessary discipline which must be maintained in any well
ordered prison. ~s was said in one case: 'The escape or attempt
to escape by a prisoner, whether from a local jail or a state prison,
tends to the general disruption of the prison discipline, and, as
often such conduct by prisoners has caused, may be the cause of
the slaying or serious wounding of officers or guards of the prison
from which the escape or attempt to escape is made. Hence, such
an act by persons legally confined in prisons or jails before their
terms of imprisonment have expired is justly regarded as among
the most flagrant violations of the rules governing prison disci.
pline.' "

Further, the court went on to note that the contentions
made by the appellant would not excuse his escape, stating:

"* * *

It is, unfortunately, possible for the conditions of imprison·
ment to be so unwholesome as to seriously imperil the health and
life of the prisoner by exposure to infection and disease, and un·
happily it is possible for prison-guards to subject prisoners to abuses
and serious physical injury unjustified by any disciplinary need.
However, a prisoner who escapes for any such reason does so at
his peril."

In a case very similar to the instant one, Hinkle v. Com·
monwealth, 66 S.W. 816 (Ky. 1902), the appellant at·
tempted to justify his forcible escape from the sheriff on the
grounds that a third person was threatening to kill him, the
third person being another prisoner. The court stated in
rejecting the basis of the defense:
"It also appears that the defendant claimed that one Steele, with
whom he had had a difficulty, and from whom he had taken t~e
pistol in question, was seeking to ?btain and threatening ~o ?btai~
a pistol for the purpos~ of shootm~ the defendant. This, !11 out
opinion, does not constitute a suffic1e~t defense for the def~ndan ~
and did not authorize him to escape trom the deputy shenff wh
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had the warrant of arre~t, and who, in obedience to the magistrate, attempted to obtam control of the defendant and disarm
him.***"

In Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Sec. 1378,
the author speaks of the concept of "necessity" that may be
a defense to an escape. Even so, however, it is stated:
"The condition of the jail, or prison camp, or the unsanitary condition of the prisoner's cell, is not a sufficient justification for escape.
The defendant cannot raise the defense that he escaped because of
the insecurity of the place of his confinement." (Emphasis added).

Other cases have clearly recognized this concept. State v.
Davis, 14 Nev. 439, 33 Am. Rep. 563; Johnson v. State, 122
Ga. 172, 50 S.E. 65.
From what has been said it clearly appears that the appellant has erroneously selected his defense and, further,
that even so, he is not entitled to raise the defense based
upon his conduct. The appellant made no effort to seek the
protection of the courts or bring the matter to the attention
of the Board of Corrections by writing. It would be a serious
weakening to prison discipline to allow a defendant to
contend that because of some situation or condition in the
prison which might be correctable and not be an immediate danger to his person, that he is justified in escaping.
POINT II.
THE FACTS IN THE INST ANT CASE DID NOT PROPERLY
RAISE A DEFENSE OF COERCION OR DURESS.

Even assuming that the defense of coercion or duress
may be applicable in the instant case, from the standpoint
of an appropriate legal defense, it is submitted that the facts
that were before the trial court did not raise an issue of
coercion sufficient to constitute a defense. The cases have
generally recognized that before the defense of coercion is
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properly raised, that there must be a present danger at the
time the offense is committed. People v. Sanders, 82 Cal.
~pp. 778, 256 Pac. 251 ( 1927), and that a remote danger
is not enough. People v. Martin, 13 Cal. App. 96, 108 Pac.
1034 ( 1910) . The danger of death or serious bodily injury
must be present, impending and imminent. State v. Weston
109 Ore. 19, 219 Pac. 180 (1923); People v. Villegas,29
Cal. App. 2d 658, 85 P.2d 480 ( 1939). Thus, in Clark and
Marshall, Crimes, Sec. 516, p. 327, it is stated:
)

"Compulsion does not amount to a defense where the threats are of
future injury only. The threatened injury must be present and
impending."

In Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490 (10th Cir.,
1935), it was stated:
"Coercion which will excuse the commission of a criminal act must
be immediate and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily injury if the act is not
done. One who has full opportunity to avoid the act without
danger of that kind cannot invoke the doctrine of coercion and is
not entitled to an instruction submitting that question to the jury."

Further, it is well recognized that the threat must continue
during the whole of the time during which the illegal act is
occurring. Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law, 31; Clark
and Marshall, supra Sec. 516; State v. Goode, 165 N.E.2d
28 (Ohio App.) ; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 44, p. 136.
Thus, in 40 A.L.R.2d 908, 910, the rule that the force and
fear must continue throughout the time of the act is recognized as respects the crime of treason.
Applying the facts of this case to the requirement that
the fear of death or bodily harm be imminent, it is obvious
that in the instant case at the time the appellant effected his
escape, the threat was no longer imminent. The appellant
had removed himself from his tormentors, was in the pres·
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ence of another prisoner who aided him in the escape, hid
for a short period of time in the Prison Chapel where he was
free from any imminent danger, was free from coercion
after he removed himself from the immediate fenced portion of the Prison, but, continued to pursue his escape and
did so even though he was being shot at and was wounded.
His co-defendant gave up prior to the time the appellant
was apprehended. It is clear, therefore, that there was no
imminent danger which would justify an instruction of the
jury on coercion, nor did the defendant cease his conduct
at the first opportunity, which is a recognized prerequisite.
The trial court properly refused to give an instruction on
the matter and ruled correctly in striking the evidence because there was no showing that at the time the offense was
committed that there was imminent danger of death or
bodily harm. Perkins, Criminal Law, p. 845 ( 1958).
The appellant argues that the Utah statute cited infra,
p. 3, does not require that the coercion be of an imminent
and impending nature. It does not appear that the Utah
Supreme Court has passed on this matter. However, the
Utah statute is identical with that of California, and the
California courts have still felt that the word "reasonable,"
as used in the statute, requires that the danger be impending, present and imminent. People v. Martin, supra; People
u. Otis, 174 Cal. App. 2d 119, 344 P.2d 342 ( 1959); People
v. Simpson, 66 Cal. App. 2d 319, 152 P.2d 339 (1944);
People v. Sanders, supra; 40 A.L.R.2d 910. Consequently,
the construction urged by the appellant of the Utah statute
would be contrary to the construction of statutes from similar jurisdictions. This court has recognized that when the
Legislature of a state has used the statute of another state or
country as a guide for the preparation and enactment of a
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statute, the courts of the adopting state will usually adopt
the construction placed on the statute in that jurisdiction.
and cases decided by the courts of a state from which a
statute was borrowed, even though subsequent to the enactment of the statute in a sister state, are helpful in construing
the legislation. Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 2 U.2d
256, 272 P.2d 177 ( 1954). Further, there is substantial reason for construing the Utah statute in line with common law
principles. First, uniformity of application is achieved;
secondly, the common law principles make certain that the
defense raised is a genuine one and not merely an acquiescence in a temptation; third, the requirement of impending
and imminent danger makes the test of reasonableness one
capable of objective evaluation rather than one attendant
with the vagaries of subjective analysis.
The appellant's contention of coercion is unmeritorious.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING THE
INSTRUCTION PROFFERED BY THE DEFENSE.

As can be seen from the two previous points, the trial
court did not commit error in refusing an instruction on the
defense of coercion. First, the concept of coercion was inapplicable to the crime charged since there was no coercion
requiring that appellant commit the specific crime. Rather,
at best, he made the choice and consequently, the defense
of duress was unavailable to him. Secondly, the evidence
clearly demonstrated beyond reason that the defendant was
not facing imminent, present and impending harm. Con·
sequently, there was no issue for the jury to consider and no
reason why they should be instructed on an inapplicable
theory. There is no error on this point.
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CONCLUSION
An analysis of the facts in this case disclose that the appellant has no basis for appeal. The legal theory to which
he addresses himself for reversal is inapplicable, first, because the defense is not properly one of coercion, and, secondly, the harm to which the appellant may have been subjected was not impending, present and imminent so as to
justify his conduct. Further, it should be noted that a substantial number of authorities have of recent questioned the
concept of duress as a defense in the absence of a showing
that the act was in fact involuntary. For an excellent analysis of the pros and cons to this position, see "A Penal Code
Prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners," pp. 19-22,
Calcutta Ed., in Kadish Criminal Law and Social Order,
Vol. 2, p. 802.
Consequently, this court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

